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TEENAGE SEXTING STATUTES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
OF IDAHO CODE 18-1507A AND AN ARGUMENT AGAINST 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CONSENSUALLY SHARED SEXTS 
KACEY JONES 
ABSTRACT 
Child pornography statutes were enacted to target and prohibit adult ex-
ploitation of children. However, these laws came before the advent of 
smart phones, social media, and before sexting. Nowadays, teens are tak-
ing sexually explicit pictures of themselves and sending them to other 
teens. The problem? Their auto-pornography falls into the definition of 
child pornography and teens can and are being prosecuted for the creation, 
possession, and distribution, leading to felony convictions and sex-offender 
registration. In response to this, many states have enacted specific legisla-
tion to address teenage sexting and remove it from falling under the child 
pornography umbrella. In 2016, Idaho passed such a statute: Idaho Code 
18-1507A. While this statute succeeds in separating teen sexting from child 
pornography, it results in overcriminalization and raises serious potential 
constitutional and policy issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The prevalence of cell phone use and social media networking has and is con-
tinuing to change the way individuals in society interact and communicate. While 
teenage years have been recognized as a period of developing maturity and sexual 
exploration, new technology has created new challenges. When teenagers use cell 
phones or social media to create or share sexual messages and images, laws come 
in to play that were not intended to handle this type of conduct. Child pornography 
laws intended to protect minors from sexual exploitation are now being used to 
prosecute those same minors for pictures taken and shared consensually.1 And 
while these laws also extend to images taken or shared non-consensually, that crim-
inalization structure leaves senders of self-created images at a disadvantage by dis-
incentivizing reporting due to sender liability and severe potential penalties, includ-
ing jail time, monetary fines, and sex-offender registration requirements.2 Because 
sexting is outside of the scope of conduct contemplated in the framing of traditional 
child pornography laws, many states have begun to reform their child pornography 
statutes to account for teenage sexting while other states have enacted separate 
and independent sexting legislation.3 However, such reformations have been incon-
sistent in their approach and scope and often still result in harsh penalties and over-
criminalization. 
In February 2016, Idaho House Bill 555 was proposed to address the issues 
associated with prosecuting teens under these statutes.4 House Bill 555 sought to 
create new legislation to specifically and independently address teenage sexting 
and remove such conduct from falling under the umbrella of other laws, such as 
child pornography statutes.5 In April 2016, the bill passed and was codified into law 
as Idaho Code Section 18-1507A.6 While this new law has succeeded in creating in-
dependent and separate legislation directed specifically at teenagers sharing sexual 
images of themselves with others, its penalty structure has fallen short of its original 
purpose. 
Part II of this Article will examine sexting generally as a behavior and practice 
as well as its prevalence today, specifically among teenagers.7 This Part will also 
briefly discuss the specific dangers of sexting among teenagers.8 Part III will examine 
the legal responses to teenage sexting by discussing teenage prosecution under tra-
ditional child pornography statutes, as well as the various approaches to this issue 
that states are currently taking.9 Part IV will critically examine Idaho’s new sexting 
                                                                
 1. See infra Section III.A. 
 2. See infra Section III.A. 
 3. See infra Section III.B. 
 4. H. 555, 63d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016). 
 5. Id. See also Associated Press, Idaho Lawmakers Approve Bill to Lessen Sexting Charges, KTVB 
(Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.ktvb.com/news/local/capitol-watch/idaho-lawmakers-approve-bill-to-lessen-
sexting-charges/66613647; Staff Reports, Idaho Lawmaker Introducing Bill Addressing “Sexting,” LOCAL NEWS 
8 (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.localnews8.com/news/kifi-top-story/idaho-lawmaker-introduces-bill-ad-
dressing-sexting/58657165. 
 6. IDAHO CODE § 18-1507A (2016).  
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
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statute and address its inconsistency when viewed alongside other Idaho criminal 
statutes.10 Part V will briefly discuss the potential constitutional issues that could 
arise under First Amendment, Equal Protection and Due Process challenges.11 
Lastly, Part VI will examine policy issues with Idaho’s current statute and address 
how this criminal structure fails to adequately and appropriately address the issues 
raised by teenage sexting.12 
II. THE RISE OF TEENAGE SEXTING 
“[S]exting . . . has become today’s new first base. In other words, it’s be-
coming a part of growing up.”13 
A. Sexting Statistics 
Technology has had an increasingly prevalent role in our society, particularly 
in the lives of teenagers. In 2008, the average child in the U.S. got his or her first cell 
phone around the age of ten or eleven.14 As of 2010, 75% of teenagers in the United 
States between the ages of twelve and seventeen owned cell phones.15 This number 
has continued to rise over the last half decade.16 The prevalence of smartphones 
with internet access has resulted in an overwhelmingly teenage presence on social 
media sites and applications such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram.17 
Over 90% of teens report going online daily.18 Cell phone use has shifted from 
merely making phone calls to texting to sharing virtually any aspect of a person’s 
life.19 Teenage years are characterized as a period of maturing, growth, and often 
sexual exploration.20 It is not surprising that teenagers have taken to their cell 
phones and social media in these respects as well. 
                                                                
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See infra Part VI. 
 13. Amy Joyce, Yes, Even Your Child: New Study Shows Sexting is the New First Base. But Don’t 
Panic Yet, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parent-
ing/wp/2014/10/06/sexting-is-the-new-first-base-yes-maybe-even-your-
child/?utm_term=.627ba37c1bdd. 
 14. Maryam F. Mujahid, Note, Romeo and Juliet – A Tragedy of Love by Text: Why Targeted Pen-
alties that Offer Front-End Severity and Back-End Leniency are Necessary to Remedy the Teenage Mass-
Sexting Dilemma, 55 HOW. L.J. 173, 179 (2011). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET 
& TECH. (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-2015/. 
 17. Id. 71% of teens ages thirteen to seventeen report using Facebook, 52%use Instagram, 41% 
use Snapchat, 33% use Twitter, 33% use Google+, 24% use Vine, 14% use Tumblr, and 11% use a different 
social media site. Id. Over 70% of teenagers in this age group use more than one social media networking 
site. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Mujahid, supra note 14, at 175. 
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Sexting is, by its most general definition, the act of sending sexual messages, 
often through the use of cell phones.21 While this can technically include merely 
sexually suggestive text messages, the term most often refers to an individual shar-
ing nude or semi-nude photos of themselves with an intended recipient, either by 
cell phone or through social media.22 Sexting is not conduct that is limited to teen-
age folly and indiscretion.23 “While the convention may be popular among text-
savvy teens, sexting has become more prevalent among older generations, as one 
in 10 baby boomers surveyed admitted to sending or receiving explicit photos.”24 
Even celebrities have been public about their own sexting practices, from Anna 
Kendrick, to Snoop Dogg, to Martha Stewart.25 Celebrities have been vocal about 
engaging in the conduct, as well as the public sting that follows when such sexts are 
made public.26 However, sexting does not carry criminal liability when it is engaged 
in privately by consenting adults. Teenagers are sexting in much higher numbers 
than adults and are often not considering the full spectrum of real consequences 
that could arise from their actions, both by virtue of the inherent risks of sexting 
and laws prohibiting sexting involving minors. 
Sexting is increasingly prevalent among teenagers, with one study finding that 
nearly 25% of teenagers have engaged in sexting.27 A 2008 study by the National 
Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy found that around 20% of 
teenagers had posted or sent semi-nude pictures or videos of themselves.28 Nearly 
70% of teenagers who sext do so with their boyfriend or girlfriend.29 Just under 40% 
of teenagers reported that it is common for such photos to be shared with people 
other than the intended recipient.30 While 17% of teenagers report that they have 
                                                                
 21. See Xiyin Tang, The Perverse Logic of Teen Sexting Prosecutions (And How to Stop It), 19 B.U.J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 106, 118 (2013); see also LUCY SALCIDO CARTER, EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO TEEN SEXTING: A GUIDE FOR 
JUDGES AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS 2 (Jennifer L. White & Michael W. Runner eds. 2012) [hereinafter CARTER]; 
11 Facts about Sexting, DOSOMETHING.ORG (last visited Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.dosome-
thing.org/us/facts/11-facts-about-sexting [hereinafter 11 Facts about Sexting]. 
 22. CARTER, supra note 21, at 2. 
 23. See Sara Gates, Adult Sexting on the Rise: 1 in 5 Americans Send Explicit Text Messages, Poll 
Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/08/adult-sex-
ting_n_1581234.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. On an episode of Ellen, guests Anna Kendrick, Snoop Dogg, and Martha Stewart played a 
round of “Never Have I Ever.” The Ellen Show, Never Have I Ever with Martha Stewart, Snoop Dog, and Anna 
Kendrick, ELLENTUBE (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.ellentube.com/video/never-have-i-ever-with-martha-
stewart-snoop-dogg-and-anna-kendrick.html. In response to the question “Have you ever sexted?” all three 
guests responded affirmatively: “I have.” Id. 
 26. Vanessa Hudgens, Scarlett Johansson, and Jennifer Lawrence are just a few celebrities who 
have come into the national spotlight when personal sexually explicit photographs were shared with the 
public. See Jessica Valenti, The Jennifer Lawrence Nude Photo Hack Response is the End of the ‘Shamed 
Starlet’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/08/jennifer-law-
rence-naked-photo-response-vanity-fair-interview.  
 27. See Joyce, supra note 13; 11 Facts about Sexting, supra note 21. 
 28. Specifically, 22% of teenage girls and 18% of teenage boys. Sex and Tech: Results From a 
Survey of Teens and Young Adults, NAT’L CAMPAIGN PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 1 (Dec. 2008), 
http://apo.org.au/node/17127 [hereinafter Sex and Tech]. 
 29. 11 Facts about Sexting, supra note 21. 
 30. Specifically, 36% of teenage girls and 39% of teenage boys. Sex and Tech, supra note 28, at 
3. 
 
2018 TEENAGE SEXTING STATUTES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF IDAHO 
CODE 18-1507A AND AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CRIMINALIZATION 
OF CONSENSUALLY SHARED SEXTS 
647 
 
shared sexts they received with others, around 55% of those that share sexts do so 
with more than one person.31 Around 30% of teenagers reported having personally 
had such an image, originally meant for someone else, shared with them.32 
These statistics are somewhat alarming but made even more so by the fact 
that social pressure to engage in sexting seems to play a strong role. According to 
one study, 51% of teenage girls and 18% of teenage boys reported pressure from 
the opposite sex to share nude or semi-nude images of themselves.33 Another study 
found that over 60% of teenagers who had sent nude images were pressured to do 
it at least once.34 
Of additional concern is that most teenagers are not aware that sexting could 
be considered criminal or prosecuted as child pornography.35 One study found that 
54% of high school students did not consider getting in trouble with the law a con-
cern when sending or posting sexually explicit pictures or videos of themselves.36 
Conversely, one-third of high school students who sent a sexually explicit image did 
so “despite knowing that, if they were apprehended for the picture, serious legal 
consequences would follow.”37 Teenagers often lack awareness of the potential 
consequences and fail to recognize sexting as an inherently risky act. Sexting has 
                                                                
 31. 11 Facts about Sexting, supra note 21.  
 32. Specifically, 25% of teenage girls and 33% of teenage boys. Sex and Tech, supra note 28, at 
3. 
 33. Id. See also CARTER, supra note 21, at 4 (stating that around 50% of teens who send sexually 
explicit photos of themselves felt pressure to do so and that this occurs more predominately among teenage 
girls than among boys). 
 34. 11 Facts about Sexting, supra note 21. 
 35. Kelly Wallace, Chances are, Your Teen Has Sexted, CNN (Jan. 2, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/living/teens-sexting-what-parents-can-do/.  
 36. Reid McEllrath, Keeping Up with Technology: Why a Flexible Juvenile Sexting Statute is 
Needed to Prevent Overly Severe Punishment in Washington State, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1009, 1015 (2014). 
 37. Id. 
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not been linked to other risky behavior in teenagers.38 “[T]eens who sexted were 
not more likely to have multiple sexual partners, use drugs or alcohol before sex or 
not use birth control.”39 Teenagers who engage in sexting are often well-functioning 
and are “not having problems.”40 
B. The Dangers of Teenage Sexting 
Sharing sexually explicit images of one’s self carries with it inherent risks and 
potential consequences. However, the particular nature of sharing such images in 
the digital mediums of text message or social media41 is that the images can be 
saved, stored, and shared beyond what may have been originally intended. The re-
ported rate at which such images are being shared, especially when taking into ac-
count the heightened pressure that may be motivating teenagers to take and send 
these pictures, illustrates the presence of an environment rife and ready for cyber-
bullying, exploitation, and extortion of teenagers by teenagers. “[W]hen nude pic-
tures sent initially between possible or actual romantic partners get spread much 
more widely involving adolescents, it sometimes leads to disastrous consequences, 
like cyberbullying, threats, extortion, and suicide.”42 This environment is more than 
theoretical. There have already been examples of this phenomenon and they have 
had tragic endings.43 
One such example is the story of a thirteen-year-old teenage girl, “Hope.”44 
Hope sent a topless picture of herself to a fellow teenage student.45 The student 
then mass-texted and shared the picture, without Hope’s permission or consent.46 
Hope became the victim of vicious ridicule and cyberbullying from students and 
friends because of the photo.47 Ultimately, as a result of the bullying, Hope hanged 
herself.48 The story of teenager Jessica Logan is all too similar.49 Jessica sent a nude 
picture to her then-boyfriend.50 After the two broke up, he shared the picture with-
out her consent with students in their high school as well as a nearby high school.51 
Jessica, too, became the victim of intense cyberbullying.52 As a result of the bullying, 
her grades began to suffer and she experienced very real emotional damages be-
fore taking her own life.53 
                                                                
 38. See Wallace, supra note 35. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Sex and Tech, supra note 28; 11 Facts about Sexting, supra note 21; CARTER, supra note 21, at 
4; McEllrath, supra note 36 at 1015. 
 42. What Jennifer Lawrence Can Teach Us about Sexting Among Teens, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. 
(Oct. 8, 2014), http://cyberbullying.org/jennifer-lawrence-can-teach-us-sexting-among-teens#.  
 43. See Mujahid, supra note 14, at 183–84. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Mujahid, supra note 14, at 183–84. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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These stories, while tragic and perhaps not the commonplace result of sexting 
indiscretions, do illustrate the real dangers that may arise from sexting between 
teenagers that lack the maturity to comprehend and cope with such consequences. 
Idaho is not immune to this behavior: 
Idaho’s school suicide rate is 49 percent above the national average. Ac-
cording to State Department of Education figures, one in 10 students have 
either switched schools or dropped out due to bullying; one of seven stu-
dents has seriously considered suicide and one in fourteen students has 
attempted to take his or her own life.54  
Teenagers are not as capable as adults of perceiving and considering the po-
tential consequences of their actions.55 With regard to sexting in particular, such 
lack of consideration extends beyond the practical and social consequences to po-
tential legal consequences. However, at their developmental stage, teenagers are 
ill-equipped to deal with these situations. As the above stories indicate, teenagers 
lack maturity that leads to both the bullying conduct and the sometimes-tragic re-
action. 
III. LEGAL RESPONSES TO TEENAGE SEXTING 
“[U]nderage sexting in America can have vastly different legal implications 
depending on the state in which it occurs.”56 
A. Prosecution Under Child Pornography Statutes 
The prevalence and normalcy of sexting makes deterrence an unlikely result 
of the criminalization of teenage sexting, especially when the sexts are consensually 
shared. However, until recently (and still currently, in some states), teen sexting 
specific laws did not exist.57 
The law lags behind the technology . . .  Sexting is treated as child pornog-
raphy in almost every state and it catches teens completely offguard be-
cause this is a fairly natural and normal thing for them to do. It is surprising 
to . . . parents, but for teens it’s part of their culture.58 
“In the absence of laws that address sexting specifically, prosecutors have re-
lied on existing criminal statutes in areas such as child pornography . . . to address 
                                                                
 54. Kevin Richert, New Anti-Bullying Law Signed, IDAHOEDNEWS (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.ida-
hoednews.org/news/new-anti-bullying-law-becomes-law/.  
 55. McEllrath, supra note 36, at 1014; John Kip Cornwell, Sexting: 21st-Century Statutory Rape, 
66 SMU L. REV. 111, 126 (2013). 
 56. Greg Botelho & Michael Martinez, DA: No Charges Against Colorado Students in Sexting 
Scandal, CNN (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/09/us/colorado-sexting-scandal-canon-city/. 
 57. See Cornwell, supra note 55, at 123–24. These state statutes will be addressed in more detail 
in Section II.B. 
 58. Deborah Feyerick & Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen on Sex Offender List, CNN (Apr. 8, 
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/07/sexting.busts/index.html?iref=nextin.  
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this conduct.”59 When teenage sexting conduct is criminalized under traditional 
child pornography statutes, the results are often overly harsh, unfair, inconsistent, 
and left largely up to individual prosecutors’ discretion.60 “While sending and re-
ceiving sexually explicit photographs of underage children is illegal everywhere in 
the U.S., most states fail to distinguish between truly evil, predatory behavior . . . 
and teens who are basically the same age participating in consensual relationships 
. . . . ”61 Prosecution of teenage sexting under child pornography statutes can po-
tentially lead to fines, jailtime, and even sex-offender registry.62 “The burgeoning 
use of child pornography laws to address such a wide range of sexting and sexting-
related cases not only fosters injustice, but distorts an offense category whose pur-
pose is to protect, not prosecute, children.”63 
There have been several well-discussed instances of prosecution for teenage 
sexting-related offenses.64 In State of Iowa v. Canal, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld 
the conviction of an eighteen-year-old boy for sending a sexually explicit picture of 
himself to a fourteen-year-old girl.65 This conviction required the teenager to regis-
ter as a sex offender, despite the fact that the girl who received the picture had 
repeatedly requested that he send her the picture.66 Likely, the boy will be branded 
as a sex offender for the rest of his life as a result. This was the first higher state 
court case of this nature, and the precedent it established is troubling.67 
In A.H. v. State, a Florida appellate court upheld the conviction of a teenage 
girl for emailing her boyfriend pictures of the two engaged in sexual intercourse.68 
The email and pictures were found inadvertently rather than shared with a third 
party by either the girl or her boyfriend.69 Again, this case illustrates an issue with 
the prosecution of sexting under child pornography statutes. 
In another particularly harsh example of teenage prosecution under child por-
nography statutes, an eighteen-year-old teenage boy was prosecuted for pos-
sessing five pictures of a thirteen-year-old girl he met online.70 The pictures showed 
the girl in her underwear but contained no nudity and her face was not included in 
the images.71 She had sent him the pictures voluntarily and he did not share them 
                                                                
 59. See Cornwell, supra note 55, at 12324. 
 60. See Tang, supra note 21, at 122; see also McEllrath, supra note 36, at 1019. 
 61. Robby Soave, Perverting Teen Sexting Laws: Column, USA TODAY (Jan. 10, 2016), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/01/10/perverting-teen-sexting-laws-criminal-felony-ab-
bott-copening-column/77745364/.  
 62. CARTER, supra note 21, at 3. 
 63. Cornwell, supra note 55, at 127. See also CARTER, supra note 21, at 3 (arguing that laws in-
tended to protect children are being used to punish them). 
 64. See State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 2009); A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007); CARTER, supra note 21, at 6; Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 58.  
 65. Canal, 773 N.W.2d at 533. 
 66. Id. at 529. 
 67. Id.; CARTER, supra note 21, at 6. 
 68. See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Douglas Berman, Hard-to-Believe Harshness in Prosecution of Virginia Teen Receiving Under-
age Pics, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Feb. 14, 2017), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_pol-
icy/2017/02/hard-to-believe-harshness-in-prosecution-of-virginia-teen-receiving-underage-pics.html.  
 71. Id. 
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but was prosecuted for possession of child pornography.72 “He faced a choice be-
tween a possible (though unlikely) maximum sentence of 350 years in prison, or 
lifetime on the sex-offender registry as a ‘sexually violent offender’ – even though 
he never met the girl in person.”73 
Phillip Alpert’s case is factually, and significantly, different.74 When he was 
eighteen, Phillip Alpert received naked pictures from his sixteen-year-old girl-
friend.75 After a fight, Alpert forwarded one such picture to over seventy people, 
including his girlfriend’s family members.76 “‘It was a stupid thing I did because I 
was upset and tired and it was the middle of the night and I was an immature kid,’ 
says Alpert.”77 Alpert was convicted under a child pornography statute, sentenced 
to five years’ probation, and required to register as a sex offender.78 
Alpert’s case differs from the aforementioned cases because of one very im-
portant fact: Alpert, rather than his girlfriend in the picture, shared the images. 
Alpert did so without her permission or consent in an attempt to embarrass and 
hurt his girlfriend.79 This type of malicious intent and exploitative conduct is funda-
mentally different than the consensual sharing of sexual images between senders 
and recipients. Accordingly, it should be treated differently in the eyes of the law. 
B. Varied State Law Approaches to Sexting-Specific Legislation 
In 2015, in Colorado, a student sexting ring was discovered at a high school 
that involved hundreds of explicit photographs of students, some as young as eighth 
grade.80 A majority of the photographs were both taken and shared by the students 
in the images.81 The question of the students’ criminal liability became of serious 
concern.82 
[The District Attorney] said he would charge students only if absolutely 
necessary, but warned that consent is not a factor when dealing with nude 
photographs of children under the age of 18. “It doesn’t matter if it was 
                                                                
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting Lenore Skenazy, Teen Girl Sent Teen Boy 5 Inappropriate Pictures. He Faced Life-
time Registry as a ‘Violent Sex Offender’ or 350 Years in Jail, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Feb. 14, 2017), 
http://reason.com/blog/2017/02/14/teen-girl-sends-teen-boy-5-pix-of-self-i). The teenage boy was also 
charged for trying to arrange a sexual meeting with the girl in addition to possessing the pictures. Berman, 
supra note 70.  
 74. CARTER, supra note 21, at 6 (citing Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 58). 
 75. CARTER, supra note 21, at 6 (citing Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 58). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 58. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Sexting Ring Uncovered at Colorado High School, SKYNEWS (Nov. 7, 2015), 
http://news.sky.com/story/sexting-ring-uncovered-at-colorado-high-school-10340395.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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consensual . . . There is no distinction according to Colorado state stat-
utes.”83 
Ultimately, no students were criminally prosecuted in the instance, although 
many faced suspensions and other school-imposed penalties.84 Because Colorado 
does not have a law to address teenage sexting,85 these students would have been 
prosecuted under Colorado’s child pornography statute and faced serious felony 
charges, but for the District Attorney’s use of prosecutorial discretion.86 Colorado is 
one of almost thirty states that do not have sexting legislation and still rely on child 
pornography statutes to address teenage sexting.87 “The result [highlights the fact] 
that underage sexting in America can have vastly different legal implications de-
pending on the state in which it occurs” and the individual prosecutor’s discretion.88 
As sexting has grown increasingly prevalent, the prosecution of teenagers un-
der child pornography statutes has called states to reexamine their statutes.89 
“States are scrambling to update laws in response to this growing phenomenon. To 
date, 20 states have laws specifically criminalizing sexting.”90 The approaches taken 
by states vary widely in their structure, penalties, and coverage.91 Generally, states 
that have drafted sexting statutes or revised their existing child pornography stat-
utes consider the following factors: the age of the sender and recipient, the conduct 
involved, voluntariness and state of mind, and the penalty structure.92 Some state 
statutes specifically use the term “sexting.”93 Some statutes address sending a sext 
but not receiving one, while other statutes address both.94 Some statutes impose 
misdemeanor or felony penalties while others impose diversionary or informal 
sanctions.95 Some statutes provide for affirmative defenses and others still allow 
for sex-offender registry.96 These broad considerations have led to a diverse set of 
statutory schemes. 
States that rely on child pornography statutes or have expressly declined to 
create lesser penalties for teenage sexting impose punishments up to felony impris-
onment and sex-offender registration.97 On the other end of the spectrum, more 
                                                                
 83. Id. 
 84. Botelho & Martinez, supra note 56. 
 85. In response to this incident, a bill was proposed in Colorado to enact sexting legislation. See 
Why Proposed Sexting Law is Facing Pushback in Colorado, CBS NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colorado-bill-proposal-to-downgrade-sexting-to-misdemeanor-faces-
pushback/.  
 86. Botelho & Martinez, supra note 56. 
 87. Id.; Teen Sexting on the Rise: What This Could Mean for Your Child, TEENSAFE (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.teensafe.com/blog/teen-sexting-rise-mean-child/ [hereinafter TEENSAFE]. 
 88. Botelho & Martinez, supra note 56. 
 89. TEENSAFE, supra note 87. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Sexting Laws: A Brief Review of State 
Sexting and Revenge Porn Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (July 2015), https://cyberbully-
ing.org/state-sexting-laws.pdf. 
 92. See Cornwell, supra note 55, at 129. 
 93. See generally Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 91. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Botelho & Martinez, supra note 56. 
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progressive states are examining “new laws providing informal punishments to un-
derage youths such as counseling, community service, and Internet safety educa-
tion, perhaps without any juvenile record of the misdemeanor offense as long as 
coercion, blackmailing and other serious offenses aren’t involved.”98 In fact, Califor-
nia has proposed a statute that would grant significant power to schools to respond 
to sexting offenses, allowing them to go so far as to expel students who violate the 
sexting law, in lieu of criminal liability.99 
Many states fall in between these two extremes. Louisiana, for example, im-
poses a fine and allows for up to ten days imprisonment for a first offense.100 Of the 
states with sexting legislation,101 eleven states classify the offense as a misde-
meanor and impose diversion remedies and informal sanctions.102 These diversion 
remedies and informal sanctions include supervision, community service, participa-
tion in counseling or an educational program, and referral to family court.103 Four 
states allow for felony charges to be brought, but even these states approach this 
differently.104 Florida and Utah allow felony charges to be brought for repeat of-
fenders, while Georgia makes this determination on a factual case-by-case basis.105 
Nebraska is an outlier as the only state with sexting legislation that makes all sexting 
offenses a felony.106 
Nebraska is one of eight states whose statutes provide for affirmative de-
fenses based on certain factors, such as (1) if the images were shared consensually, 
(2) if they were not distributed to others, and (3) if the ages of the sender and re-
cipient do not fall outside specific age ranges.107 Of these states, six have an affirm-
ative defense for the teenager who receives the sext but no affirmative defense for 
the sender.108 Only two states, Nebraska and Texas, currently have an affirmative 
defense available to both the sender and receiver.109 
                                                                
 98. Id. 
 99. See Sonali Kohli, A New California Bill Would Let Schools Expel Kids for Sexting, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-schools-sexting-bill-20160304-
story.html.  
 100. TEENSAFE, supra note 87. 
 101. According to the article, the states with sexting laws are: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Botelho & Martinez, supra 
note 56. However, more states have adopted sexting legislation, such as Idaho, or are in the process of 
proposing sexting-specific legislation. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2017); see also IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-1507A (West 2016). 
 102. Bothelo & Martinez, supra note 56. 
 103. See generally Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 91. 
 104. Bothelo & Martinez, supra note 56. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Nebraska’s affirmative defense applies to teenagers age eighteen and under who engaged 
in sexting with a minor at least fifteen-years-old. Id.; see also McEllrath, supra note 36, at 1020-21. 
 108. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Nevada, and Vermont. See McEllrath, 
supra note 36, at 1022. 
 109. Id. 
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While these statutes or statutory revisions represent the much-needed shift 
from teenage prosecution for sexting under traditional child pornography statutes, 
the wide spectrum and diversity of varied approaches has not ultimately provided 
for a resolution. Nearly every aspect of the laws is different from state to state, from 
what constitutes a sext that will implicate the law to the ages covered by the stat-
ute.110 Additionally, prosecution under these statutes is still dependent on prosecu-
torial discretion. The result is that teenagers are facing drastically different criminal 
liability for the same action depending on which state they are in. This is of even 
greater concern when the nature of the conduct is mobile and occurs through cell 
phones or social media that extend beyond and outside of clearly defined state bor-
ders. 
The chart below includes states that have adopted sexting legislation and 




















IV. IDAHO’S STATUTORY SCHEME 
“The purpose of this legislation is to remove minors who [sext] from stat-
utes codified to target sexual predators[.]”112 
                                                                
 110. See generally Cornwell, supra note 55; Mujahid, supra note 14; Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 
91. 
 111. This table has been edited from the source table to only include states with sexting statutes 
as of the date the original table was created (2013). This table was recreated to include only relevant col-
umns. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 91; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507A (West 2017). 
 112. H. 555, 63d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016). 
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A. Idaho House Bill 555 
Idaho Code 18-1507 sets forth Idaho’s child pornography statute.113 The stat-
ute states that a person commits sexual exploitation of a child if he knowingly and 
willfully possesses or accesses sexually exploitative material,114 or plays a role in the 
process by which the material is made or distributed.115 Possession or access of such 
material results in a felony, punishable by up to ten years in prison and a fine up to 
$10,000.116 Any other conduct, such as inducement, production, or distribution of 
the material results in a felony punishable by up to thirty years in prison and a fine 
of up to $50,000.117 The statute defines a child as a person under the age of eight-
een.118 Without revision or sexting legislation, teenagers under eighteen who were 
sexting each other were in violation of this statute and faced long prison sentences, 
fines, and sex-offender registry.119 In response to this, Idaho House Bill 555 was pro-
posed.120 
Idaho House Representative Greg Chaney proposed the bill in February 2016, 
in an effort to set forth new sexting legislation that would specifically address teen-
age conduct and would also differentiate between acts of initial sexting and the 
subsequent use of those sexts by others to exploit or bully the sender.121 Central to 
the bill’s purpose was the aim to lessen criminal penalties on teenagers consensu-
ally engaging in sexting each other, while maintaining a more harsh criminal struc-
ture targeted to teenagers using consensually sent sexual images as a means of 
                                                                
 113. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507 (West 2017). 
 114. “Sexually exploitative material” is defined as:  
[A]ny image, photograph, motion picture, video, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, 
electronically, digitally or chemically produced or reproduced visual material which shows a 
child engaged in, participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct, or 
showing a child engaging in, participating in, observing or being used for explicit sexual con-
duct, in actual time, including, but not limited to, video chat, webcam sessions or video calling. 
§18-1507(1)(j) (Westlaw). See also § 18-1507(1)(c)–(i) (Westlaw) (providing definitions for behaviors also 
prohibited under this statute). 
115.    (2) A person commits sexually exploitation of a child if he knowingly and willfully: 
(a) Possesses or accesses through any means including, but not limited to, the internet, any 
sexually exploitative material; or 
(b) Causes, induces or permits a child to engage in, or be used for, any explicit sexual conduct 
for the purpose of producing or making sexually exploitative material; or 
(c) Promotes, prepares, publishes, produces, makes, finances, offers, exhibits or advertises 
any sexually exploitative material; or 
(d) Distributes through any means including, but not limited to, mail, physical delivery or ex-
change, use of a computer or any other electronic or digital method, any sexually exploitative 
material. 
§ 18-1507(2) (Westlaw). 
 116. § 18-1507(3) (Westlaw). 
 117. § 18-1507(4) (Westlaw). 
 118. § 18-1507(1)(b) (Westlaw). 
 119. H. 555, 63d Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.; Associated Press, supra note 5; Staff Reports, supra note 5.  
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blackmail, extortion, or cyberbullying against the original sender, typically the teen-
ager in the photo.122 
The purpose of this legislation is to remove minors who self-produce and dis-
tribute sexually exploitative material (commonly known as ‘sexting’) from statutes 
codified to target sexual predators, thereby eliminating the risk that ‘sexting’ results 
in registering as a sex offender and reserving felony status for cases of repeated 
mass-distribution. The act also creates a clear differentiation between the act of the 
initial ‘sext’ and the extortive behavior that often follows – to the great trauma of 
the sender. The intent of the legislation is to create an environment where the 
sender of a ‘sext’ feels more comfortable seeking help if he/she is being extorted 
by declaring that, as an operation of the law, the act of extortion is a greater evil.123 
The proposed law underwent various revisions, and the third draft passed 
through the Idaho Senate unanimously, before being adopted into law.124 However, 
the final product was adopted without Idaho State Governor Butch Otter’s signa-
ture.125 While Governor Otter agreed with the bill’s stated purpose, he felt the crim-
inal penalties of the law were still too harsh.126 Addressing the bill, Governor Otter 
stated that the legislature should have “[found] a way to address the concerns sur-
rounding sexting without the draconian outcomes associated with misdemeanor or 
felony punishments.”127 Governor Otter’s final messages about the bill were hope-
ful, but not optimistic: “I hope this bill will serve as a deterrent to teens sending or 
receiving sexts, but I am also not so naïve nor do I believe any law will stop this 
conduct.”128 Ultimately, the bill was adopted into law and codified as Idaho Code 
Section 18-1507A – Sexual Exploitation of a Child By Electronic Means.129 
B. Idaho’s Teen Sexting Statute: Idaho Code 18-1507A 
Idaho Code Section 18-1507A created separate and specific legislation to ad-
dress teenage sexting conduct, and prevent it from falling under the child pornog-
raphy umbrella. However, the statute falls short of achieving its goals and leaves 
many questions unanswered. Each provision of the statute will be examined in de-
tail below.130 
The first provision, Section 18-1507(1) states: 
(1) A minor child who, without being induced by coercion, manipulation or 
fraud, creates or causes to be created any photographic, electronic or 
video content of said minor child that would be characterized under any of 
                                                                
 122. H. 555, 63d Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.; see also George Prentice, Idaho Senate Approved Rewrite of Sexting Penalties for Juve-
niles, BOISE WEEKLY (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/idaho-senate-approves-rewrite-of-
sexting-penalties-for-juveniles/Content?oid=3747901.  
 125. Letter from C.L. “Butch” Otter, Governor, Idaho, to Lawrence Denny, Sec’y of State, Idaho 
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/Bills/H555a.pdf.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507A (West 2017). 
 130. Section 18-1507A(7) will not be discussed because it is jurisdictional in nature, rather than 
substantive. § 18-1507A(7) (Westlaw). 
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the classifications defined in section 18-1507(1)(c) through (j), Idaho 
Code,131 and knowingly and willfully distributes it to another person or per-
sons through electronic or other means or causes it to appear in a form 
where the distributing minor has reason to believe another recipient will 
view it is guilty of a misdemeanor provided that the image was communi-
cated in a form that there was a single recipient.132 
This provision makes it a misdemeanor for a minor to create sexually explicit 
material of themselves and send or share it with a single recipient.133 Mere posses-
sion of self-created images will not result in criminality.134 This provision does not 
contain language requiring that the sender sent or shared the images without the 
consent or solicitation of the recipient.135 However, the requirement that the image 
was not “induced by coercion, manipulation or fraud”136 could give rise to issues, in 
light of the pressure that motivates many teens to sext. Over half of teens who sext 
say they have felt pressure to do so at least one time that they did sext, and over 
half of teen girls in particular feel pressure from teen boys to sext in general.137 
When does pressure become coercion? It is not clear how this will be addressed 
under this provision. 
The second provision states: 
(2) A minor child who, without being induced by coercion, manipulation or 
fraud, creates or causes to be created any photographic, electronic or 
video content of said minor child that would be characterized under any of 
the classifications defined in section 18-1507(1)(c) through (j), Idaho 
Code,138 and knowingly and willfully distributed it in such a way and 
through such a medium that the minor intended or had reason to believe 
that multiple parties would receive or have access to the image: 
(a) is guilty of a misdemeanor on the first adjudicated offense; and 
(b) is guilty of a felony on the second or subsequent adjudicated offense.139 
This provision makes it a crime for a minor to create sexually explicit material 
of themselves and send or share it with multiple people.140 The first offense is a 
misdemeanor, and any subsequent offenses are felonies.141 This provision, like the 
                                                                
 131. Idaho Code 18-1507(1) subsections (c) through (j) set forth the definitions for the following: 
erotic fondling, erotic nudity, explicit sexual conduct, masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual excitement, 
sexual intercourse, and sexually exploitative material. § 18-1507(1)(c)–(j) (Westlaw). 
 132. § 18-1507A(1) (Westlaw). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. CARTER, supra note 21, at 3. 
 138. §§ 18-1507(1)(c)–(j) (Westlaw). 
 139. § 18-1507A(2) (Westlaw). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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last, could give rise to issues of coercion and peer pressure. Additionally, issues 
could arise in determining whether the minor “had reason to believe that multiple 
parties would receive or have access to the image[.]”142 Statistics show that over 
one third of teens report that it is common for sexts to be shared with people other 
than the original recipient, with only slightly less teens reporting that they them-
selves have had such a sext shared with them personally.143 Does this lead to a mi-
nor’s “reason to believe” that the image will be shared? In the digital age, when 
images are sent and never truly erased, does this language lend itself to a broad or 
narrow interpretation? It is not clear. 
The third provision states: 
(3) A minor who is found to be in knowing and willful possession of the 
content created and sent as described in subsection (1) or (2) of this sec-
tion is guilty of a misdemeanor if the content depicts a minor who is not 
greater than three (3) years younger than the minor who is found to be in 
possession. A minor who is found to be in knowing and willful possession 
of content described in this subsection that depicts a minor greater than 
three (3) years younger than themselves is guilty of a violation of section 
18-1507(2)(a) 144, Idaho Code.145 
This provision criminalizes a minor’s possession of sexually explicit material 
created and sent by the minor in the image.146 Because the provision specifies that 
this applies to images “created and sent as described” in the prior subsections, this 
does not extend criminal liability to the possession of the images that were not sent 
by the minor in the image.147 While this provision requires that the image was not 
“induced by coercion, manipulation or fraud,” it does not contain any requirement 
that the receiving minor did not solicit the image.148 
This provision also includes internal age divisions.149 If the possessing minor is 
not more than three years older than the minor in the materials, the possessing 
minor is guilty of a misdemeanor.150 If the possessing minor is more than three years 
older than the minor in the materials, the possessing minor is guilty of a felony un-
der the general child pornography statute.151 This age-gap distinction only works in 
one direction and are not duplicated for the sending minor.152 A teen will be sub-
jected to higher criminal liability for receiving a sext from a younger teen; however, 
the sending teen is not subject to any additional criminal liability based on an age 
                                                                
 142. Id. 
 143. Sex and Tech, supra note 28, at 3. 
 144. “A person commits sexual exploitation of a child if he knowingly and willfully[ ] (a) [p]ossesses 
or accesses through any means including, but not limited to, the internet, any sexually exploitative mate-
rial[.]” § 18-1507(2)(a) (Westlaw). 
 145. § 18-1507A(3) (Westlaw). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See also § 18-1507A(1) (Westlaw). 
 149. § 18-1507A(3) (Westlaw). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.; see §§ 18-1507A(1)–(2) (Westlaw). 
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gap, whether the sext is sent to a much younger or older teen.153 The penalty that 
results from possessing such a sext from a minor over three years younger is 
astoundingly harsh, considering that the conduct of receipt or possession is passive, 
and there is no requirement of non-solicitation. 
 
Subsection 4 of the statute provides: 
(4) A minor who is found to be in possession of the content described in 
subsection (1) or (2) of this section who knowingly and willfully transmits 
or displays the image to one (1) or more third parties: 
(a) is guilty of a misdemeanor on the first adjudicated offense; and 
(b) is guilty of a felony on any second or subsequent adjudicated offense.154 
This provision makes it a crime for a minor to possess such sexually explicit 
material and share it with one or more third parties.155 The first offense is a misde-
meanor and any subsequent offense is a felony.156 This specific provision refers to 
content that is created by the minor as described in subsections 1 and 2, but does 
not also require that it have been sent as described in those subsections.157 The 
effect is that this provision includes both the intended recipients of sexts and unin-
tended recipients. While this provision does not specifically target bullying or extor-
tive behavior, it does not include any language that would indicate that the sharing 
of the image occurs with any level of consent or knowledge from the minor in the 
image158. Interestingly, the penalty structure set forth under this provision is the 
same as that set forth for the minor who creates the image and sends it with the 
intent or reason to believe that multiple people will receive or access it.159 This 
seems to directly contradict the legislature’s stated intent to “create[] a clear dif-
ferentiation between the act of the initial sext and the extortive behavior that often 
follows.”160 
Subsection 5 of this statute deals specifically with exploitative behavior. It 
states: 
(5) A minor who receive[d] content under circumstances described in sub-
section (1) or (2) of this section and distributes or threatens to distribute 
the image for the purposes of coercing any action, causing . . . embarrass-
ment or otherwise controlling or manipulating the sender is guilty of a fel-
ony.161 
                                                                
 153. § 18-1507A(3) (Westlaw). 
 154. § 18-1507A(4) (Westlaw). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.; see also § 18-1507A(2) (Westlaw). 
 160. H. 555, 63d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016). 
 161. § 18-1507A(5). 
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This provision makes it a felony for a minor who received sexually explicit ma-
terial from the original sender to share or threaten to share the image for the pur-
poses of manipulation, exploitation, or embarrassment.162 The language of this pro-
vision differs slightly from the other possession provisions in that it specifically re-
fers to content received by the minor under subsections 1 and 2.163 This is unlike 
the language of the previous subsection that covered content defined in those sub-
sections, but not necessarily received as described therein.164 Because this provi-
sion specifically applies to minors who have received content from a sending minor, 
it does not apply to minors who receive the images in a different way, such as from 
the teen sender in the previous subsection.165 The practical effect is that this sub-
section only prohibits the conduct of the original recipient and leaves subsequent 
recipients free from this heightened liability. 
Subsection 6 provides an affirmative defense: 
(6) A minor who receives content under circumstances described in sub-
section (1) or (2) of this section and distributes the image to a parent, 
guardian, one having custody of the minor or a law enforcement official 
for the purposes of reporting the activity is not guilty of a crime under the 
provisions of this section.166 
This subsection grants an affirmative defense to minors who receive the sex-
ually explicit material from the original sender, if they share the image with a par-
ent, guardian, or law enforcement officer.167 Like the previous subsection, this is 
specific to those who receive the content from the sender, rather than from other 
recipients.168 This affirmative defense does not require that the minors did not so-
licit the content and does not extend to minors who delete the images but do not 
turn them over to an adult.169 This provision does not include language requiring 
that the minor have not shared the image to others prior to turning it over to an 
adult.170 It is not clear if subsequently doing so will remove the minor from full crim-
inal liability in the event the minor may be guilty of an offense under this subsection 
beyond mere possession. The statute does not provide any affirmative defense for 
the original sender.171 
This provision may also create problems for the parents, guardians, or custo-
dians of teenagers that are engaging in sexting. While the provision grants a defense 
to the minors for distributing the image to these adults, the statute does not ex-
pressly describe what duty this places on them.172 Additionally, the statute does not 
                                                                
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.; but see § 18-1507A(3), (4) (Westlaw). 
 164. Compare § 18-1507A(5) (Westlaw), with § 18-1507A(1)–(4) (Westlaw).  
 165. § 18-1507A(5) (Westlaw). 
 166. § 18-1507A(6) (Westlaw). Subsection (7) of the statute, omitted above, provides: “Proceed-
ings for a violation of the provisions of this section shall fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile corrections 
act pursuant to section 20-505(1), Idaho Code.” § 18-1507A(7) (Westlaw).  
 167. § 18-1507A(6) (Westlaw). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally § 18-1507A (Westlaw). 
 172. See id. 
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create a carve out in the general child pornography penalty for parents or guardians 
who have received child pornography from their children.173 The result is that par-
ents may themselves become guilty of possessing child pornography by receiving 
this content from their children, thereby passing the criminal liability from the teen 
to the adult and effectively raising the stakes. Alternatively, parents who receive 
these images and immediately turn them over to the police may be removed from 
liability, although not expressly, but at the cost of essentially turning in the minor 
in the image. 
The bill also added a provision to the preceding statutory section defining child 
pornography generally: 
(5) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, a person eighteen 
(18) years of age or older who is found to be in knowing and willful posses-
sion of content created and distributed under circumstances defined in 
section 18-1507A(1) or (2), Idaho Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor pro-
vided that: 
(a) The minor depicted in the content distributed the content in such a way 
that the minor intended the person found to be in possession to receive it; 
(b) The minor depicted in the content is not greater than three (3) years 
younger than the person found to be in possession; and 
(c) The person found to be in possession of the content did not use coer-
cion, manipulation or fraud to obtain possession of the content.174 
The practical effect of this first provision is to reduce the penalty from a felony 
to a misdemeanor for adults aged eighteen to twenty who receive sexually explicit 
materials from a minor aged fifteen to seventeen, respectively, provided that the 
adult was the intended recipient and did not use coercion, manipulation, or 
fraud.175 This mirrors the requirements and penalties set forth in subsection 3 of 
the statute, dealing with minor recipients.176 
The cumulative effect of this statute is that senders have broad criminal liabil-
ity while inconsistencies in the language of the statute provides for loopholes that 
leave many recipients, distributors, and extorters uncovered. While the intent of 
the statute was to “create an environment where the sender of a ‘sext’ feels more 
comfortable seeking help if he/she is being extorted,”177 the practical result of the 
statute is likely to be a chilling in any reporting of such extortive behavior due to 
the sender’s own liability and lack of any affirmative defenses. The statute achieved 
its goal of removing teen sexting from falling under the child pornography umbrella 
but it did so heavy-handedly and the final product still leaves teens subject to over-
criminalization. 
 
                                                                
 173. See § 18-1507 (Westlaw); § 18-1507A (Westlaw). 
 174. § 18-1507(5) (Westlaw).  
 175. Id. 
 176. Compare § 18-1507(5) (Westlaw), with § 18-1507A(3) (Westlaw). 
 177. H. 555, 63d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016). 
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C. Inconsistencies Among Idaho Statutes That Regulate Sexual Conduct on the 
Basis of Age 
Idaho’s sexting statute becomes even more concerning when it is examined in 
conjunction with other Idaho legislation. While this is Idaho’s first statutory law di-
rected specifically at teenage sexting, it is not Idaho’s first law to regulate sexual 
conduct on the basis of age.178 When examined together, the statutes are incon-
sistent in their language, coverage, and underlying policy rationales. The cumulative 
effect of these statutory schemes is that the criminal structure sets forth harsher 
penalties and more criminal liability for sharing sexual images than for engaging in 
sexual conduct, and this new statute is a shift from child and teen protection to 
punishment. 
Idaho law has the following statutory definition of rape on the basis of age: 
“(1) Where the victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years and the perpetrator is 
eighteen (18) years of age or older. (2) Where the victim is sixteen (16) or seventeen 
(17) years of age and the perpetrator is three (3) years or more older than the vic-
tim.”179 Effectively, this age-based definition of rape has created a carve out of de-
criminalization for teenagers within the age ranges to have legal, consensual sex.180 
Idaho’s sexual battery law also has age-based restrictions on conduct.181 This 
statute criminalizes a broad range of sexually explicit actions and communications 
between sixteen or seventeen-year-olds and adults at least five years older, regard-
less of consent.182 While Idaho has separate sex-offender registries for adults and 
minors,183 even the adult registry contains a carve out on the basis of the age of the 
adult offender: eighteen-year-olds who are guilty of a statutory rape are not re-
quired to register as a sex offender.184 
These laws set forth age-based restrictions with purpose, but without con-
sistency. A five year age gap will result in criminality where the adult engages in 
lewd communications with a sixteen-year-old, but a three year age gap is required 
for criminality when the adult has consensual sex with that same sixteen-year-
old.185 A nineteen-year-old can legally have sex with a seventeen-year-old but will 
be required to register as a sex offender for having consensual sex with a sixteen-
year-old.186 An eighteen-year-old who has sex with a fifteen-year-old will have vio-
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lated Idaho law but not be required to register as a sex offender; however, a nine-
teen-year-old who has sex with a sixteen-year-old will also be required to register. 
187 
These discrepancies have some logical basis: the younger the minor, the more 
protection they may need and the more serious the conduct, the more restrictions 
may be necessary. However, when the new Idaho sexting statute is added to the 
mix, the results make much less sense. Under this new sexting statute, a nineteen-
year-old that can legally have sex with a seventeen-year-old will be guilty of a mis-
demeanor for possessing a sext sent voluntarily from that seventeen-year-old.188 
Sixteen and seventeen-year-olds who can legally engage in consensual sex with 
each other will be guilty of misdemeanors for sharing consensually taken sexual im-
ages of themselves with each other.189 A twenty-year-old will be subject to a felony 
conviction and sex-offender registration for possessing a sext sent voluntarily by a 
sixteen-year-old but would not be guilty for engaging in sexual acts (short of inter-
course) with that same minor.190 The law is essentially approving engaging in sexual 
conduct over sexting within the age gaps specified. 
V. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTION CONCERNS 
“Absent restraint, minors may lose faith in the government’s commitment 
to the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.”191 
“Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess con-
stitutional rights.”192 However, the government has the right to regulate the behav-
ior and conduct of minors to a greater extent than that of adults.193 Sexting legisla-
tion implicates freedom of expression, equal protection, and due process con-
cerns.194 Of these concerns, freedom of speech seems to be the strongest basis for 
which to challenge sexting statutes. However, until such challenges are made, we 
can only speculate as to the outcome. While these constitutional issues deserve a 
thorough in-depth analysis, for the purpose of this article, only a brief discussion of 
the issues is presented. 
A. Freedom of Speech 
First Amendment challenges to sexting statutes as a violation of the freedom 
of speech and expression seem to be the strongest argument. Child pornography 
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has been recognized as an unprotected category of speech, therefore punishable 
and falling outside the bounds of the First Amendment, since the 1982 Supreme 
Court decision of New York v. Ferber.195 In Ferber, the Court made clear that child 
pornography could be prohibited without the requirement that it satisfy the Miller 
obscenity test, emphasizing the compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors.196 This category was extended to mere posses-
sion and viewing by Osborne v. Ohio in 1990.197 The Court explained that its reason 
for prohibiting possession of child pornography was “to protect the victims.”198 It is 
on this constitutional basis that states and the federal government have been able 
to broadly prohibit and criminalize child pornography. 
However, these cases arose before the advent of Facebook, Snapchat, and un-
limited texting and data smartphone plans. Accordingly, there is debate as to 
whether the rationales set forth in the cases that support the broad prohibition on 
child pornography support an equally broad ban on teenage sexting and auto-por-
nography.199 A conservative reading of Ferber lends support to the argument that 
the Court was defining the constitutionally unprotected category of child pornogra-
phy on the basis of its content, underage sexual materials, as opposed to its poten-
tial harms, exploitation of minors.200 However, some argue that the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to extend child pornography prohibition to pornography that ap-
peared to use children without actually involving real children in Ashcroft contra-
dicts such an interpretation.201 The Court in Ashcroft struck down the virtual por-
nography ban, reasoning that it “prohibit[ed] speech that records no crime and cre-
ates no victims by its production.”202 While Ashcroft dealt with virtual depictions of 
children and the teens in sexts are real, the argument is that this case focused on 
actual harm as opposed to content.203 
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of teenage 
sexting statutes,204 it seems clear that sexting statute provisions that criminalize the 
sharing or exploitation of a minor through the use of a sext will be upheld. This 
clearly falls within circumstances in which the minor participating has been harmed 
by their involvement, as well as exploited. 
It is less clear that provisions criminalizing consensual sending and receiving 
will be upheld. Without a discernable harm, it is not clear whether the Ferber or 
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Ashcroft rationale will win out.205 In such cases, the argument is that there is no 
“victim.” When a minor is the creator and sender of the sexually explicit image, the 
inherent power imbalance that exists with an adult involved has been removed.206 
Some argue that the act may actually sexually empower the minor.207 Accordingly, 
such statutes may fail when reviewed under scrutiny for their chilling effect on mi-
nors who wish to engage in such sexual self-expression by burdening “substantially 
more speech than necessary” to further the government’s interest in protecting mi-
nors from exploitation.208 
B. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may be implicated 
when a law treats individuals differently based on arbitrary or suspect characteris-
tics.209 This “constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on 
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”210 The Su-
preme Court has held age is not a suspect classification and therefore laws that 
differentiate on the basis of age are subject to rational basis review.211 State law 
“may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amend-
ment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”212 
However, challenges to teenage sexting cases brought under child pornogra-
phy statutes have repeatedly failed.213 Courts have held that such statutes survive 
the low bar of the rational basis test in large part because child pornography is un-
protected speech under the First Amendment.214 Clearly, teenage sexting statutes 
draw a distinction on the basis of age.215 The statute removes minors from the child 
pornography umbrella but, in doing so, criminalizes consensual sharing of sexting, 
conduct that is not criminalized for adults.216 Additionally, the inconsistency among 
Idaho’s sexual conduct statutes’ age-restrictions provides support for the argument 
that the age distinctions are in fact arbitrary.217 While sexting challenges to date 
have dealt with teenage prosecution under child pornography statutes as opposed 
to age-based sexting legislation, caselaw does not support a prediction that chal-
lenges on this basis would be successful. In Nebraska, an equal protection challenge 
                                                                
 205. See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 
U.S. 234 (2002). 
 206. Sweeny, supra note 204, at 972. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 976 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 (2010)). 
 209. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Sweeny, supra note 194, at 976. 
 210. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). 
 211. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000). 
 212. Id. at 83.  
 213. See Sweeny, supra note 194, at 977. 
 214. United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 215. See supra Part III; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-1507(5), -1507A (West 2017). 
 216. Id.  
 217. See supra Section IV.B. 
 
666 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
 
to a teenage sexting-specific statute was brought.218 The defense argued that the 
statute determined culpability on the basis of age, without a rational basis for the 
distinction.219 However, the court rejected the challenge, stating that “age-based 
differences in the law are not new, especially in the area of sex crimes,” and finding 
that the distinctions between the individuals were sufficiently relevant.220 Because 
exploitation of minors is a compelling interest and states are given broader leeway 
in the regulation of minor’s conduct, it is unlikely that sexting statutes will be struck 
down under rational basis scrutiny. 
C. Due Process Right to Privacy 
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutionally protected right to pri-
vacy in personal activities including marriage, procreation, contraception, family re-
lationships, and child rearing.221 The Court has also recognized a right to sexual in-
timacy between consenting adults.222 While the right to privacy applies to minors, 
states have greater latitude to regulate a minor’s conduct and can inhibit these pri-
vacy rights if the regulation serves “any significant state interest . . . that is not pre-
sent in the case of an adult.”223 
The Supreme Court has yet to hear a challenge on this issue brought by teen-
agers prosecuted under sexting statutes for consensually sexting.224 However, a 
Florida appellate court heard a privacy challenge by teens consensually sexting who 
were prosecuted under a child pornography statute and found that privacy interests 
were not implicated, in large part because the teenagers’ relative immaturity pre-
cluded a reasonable expectation that the images would not be shared, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally.225 “The court concluded that even if a right to privacy 
did exist, the statute served a compelling state interest in preventing the creation 
of sexually explicit images of minors, no matter who created them.”226 
VI. POTENTIAL POLICY PROBLEMS 
“I hope this bill will serve as a deterrent to teens sending or receiving sexts, 
but I am also not naïve nor do I believe any law will stop this conduct.”227 
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A. Non-Culpable Behavior 
House Bill 555’s original goal was to punish teenagers who use sexts to extort 
or blackmail other teenagers, rather than punish consensual conduct.228 In fact, the 
legislative statement of purpose specifically refers to creating a “clear differentia-
tion between the act of the original sext and the extortive behavior that follows,” 
by “declaring that, as an operation of law, the act of extortion is a greater evil.”229 
However, the effect of Idaho Code 18-1507A is to criminalize teenage sexting far 
more broadly than necessary, and this goal will likely not be achieved as a result. 
As written, the law criminalizes the acts of sending a sext, receiving a sext, 
sharing a sext, and using that sext to “caus[e] embarrassment or otherwise control[] 
or manipulat[e] the sender.”230 Criminal liability exists for all levels of conduct, with 
penalties up to felony punishment existing for both the sender and the extorter.231 
Additionally, the law provides an affirmative defense, but it is available only to teen-
age recipients, leaving the teenage sender of the sext out as the only unprotected 
party.232 Under this law, it does not matter whether the recipient requested the 
image or if the sender and recipient were involved in a consensual relationship; the 
sender is unprotected from liability and the recipient need only turn the image over 
to a parent or law enforcement officer to remove themselves from criminal liability. 
The practical impact of this criminalization structure is that the law will chill 
reporting of conduct that actually should be criminalized because it is criminalizing 
conduct that should not be. Society has much less concern about a teenager send-
ing a sext to another teenager consensually than it has about a teenager using a 
sext to extort another teenager. However, the law puts the sender in the worst po-
sition by not providing any affirmative defenses which will result in senders being 
less likely to come forward if or when they are being harassed or bullied. This is in 
direct conflict with the bill’s stated purpose to “create an environment where the 
sender or a sext feels comfortable seeking help if he/she is being extorted.”233 While 
the criminal penalties associated with the conduct reflects that extortion is a 
greater evil, the criminal and defense structure of the statute operates to say that 
the original sending of the sext is the more unforgivable evil. 
The real issue arises when images and sexts are not shared consensually, such 
as when an image is shared by a recipient with others without the original sender’s 
consent or when that image is used to extort or bully the sender. In that instance, 
the action at issue is bullying and extortion; the behavior at issue is culpable. Bully-
ing and extortion, unlike sexting, are not behaviors that become lawful and accepta-
ble upon reaching the statutory age of adulthood. Accordingly, these are the behav-
iors that should be focused on and criminalized. 
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The basis for discouraging teenage sexting is widely understood. However, the 
basis for criminalization of the same conduct is lacking. Are these kids taking on 
some risk? Sure. Should their parents and teachers caution them against sexting? 
Absolutely. But arresting them, expelling them from school, smearing their names 
in the news media and placing them on sex-offender registry are all punishments 
vastly disproportionate to the “crime.” Funneling teens into the criminal justice sys-
tem for expressing sexual interest in other teens is simply much more harmful to 
them than sexting is.234 
Criminal liability does not exist when adults consensually share sexts or other 
sexually explicit materials. However, an adult can be criminalized for extorting or 
blackmailing another adult. As a society, we have decided that one behavior is cul-
pable and another is not. While this same conduct may be discouraged among mi-
nors and teenagers, it should not, by the virtue of their age alone, make it culpable. 
B. Criminalization of Teenage Sexting is an Ineffective Deterrent 
The criminalization structure of sexting, in general, has questionable efficacy 
as a supposed deterrent. “As related to teen sexting, even if we take an expansive 
view of deterrence, including prevention of both harm to society and self-harm to 
the offender, it is unclear that criminal law is the best tool for the job.”235 Adults do 
it, celebrities do it. Sexting is not a behavior that is criminalized in other contexts 
and is largely normalized in society.236 “Proponents of deterrence believe that peo-
ple choose to obey or violate the law after calculating the gains and consequences 
of their actions.”237 For this reason, deterrence relies significantly on the individuals 
being deterred to actually know what the is law and its legal consequences.238 While 
this is aspirational in general, it is highly unlikely to be the case when those individ-
uals are teenagers.239 
Generally, the idea of deterrence is that people will be less likely to engage in 
an act if the punishment for that act is swift, certain, and severe.240 Here, sexting 
laws, and Idaho’s statute, in particular, satisfies the severity component by setting 
forth harsh criminal penalties for engaging in teen sexting. However, the swiftness 
and certainty of that punishment are lacking. Studies have shown that the certainty 
and predictability of punishment are more important in effective deterrents than 
the severity of the punishment.241 Because this predictability is lacking, the statute 
and its criminal structure will be ineffective as a deterrent. 
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The legal system, in general, is not a swift machine and necessarily the tem-
poral space between the actual act of a crime and the actual receipt of the punish-
ment is usually large. This is especially the case when the crime is teenage sexting. 
There is not a victim of consensual sexting and accordingly it is not likely that some-
one is reporting the conduct when it is occurring privately between consenting par-
ties. At this time, there aren’t apps on teenagers’ phones that are detecting and 
reporting this conduct in real time when it is occurring. This means that sexts in 
violation of this statute are only being brought to the attention of law enforcement 
after the fact, potentially far removed from the actual conduct of sending or receiv-
ing. Because there is no tool for quick discovery or reporting of this conduct, and 
the legal system is inherently slow-moving, the swiftness factor is lacking. 
Certainty is also not present. Because sexts are shared privately and not easily 
detected and reported, there is a very low chance that a teen who sends a sext will 
have that fact made known to law enforcement. And, even if that fact is shared, it 
is up to prosecutorial discretion as to whether any criminal charges will be filed 
against the teen. As seen in the Colorado sexting ring, prosecutors have been hesi-
tant to bring charges against teenagers for consensual sexting, largely because of 
the harsh penalties.242 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Sexting is happening. Adults are doing it and teenagers are too. While society 
may have an interest in discouraging minors from engaging in this conduct, it has 
also demonstrated an interest in protecting minors from the consequences. Sexting 
statutes are addressing the problems of prosecuting teen sexting under child por-
nography statutes, but they are doing so by sending minors down the same path: 
criminalization. Idaho’s statute, in particular, over-criminalizes teen sexting con-
duct, and does so inconsistently and incoherently. Protection, not punishment, is 
needed and education, not criminalization, is the key to achieving that goal. 
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